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The remuneration package is made up of some or all of the following:
Salaries are reviewed annually, but increases are made only where the Committee believes that adjustments are appropriate to reflect contribution, increased responsibilities and/or market pressures. No base pay changes were proposed or made, save that the Committee agreed an increase in base salary
effective on 1 January 2005 for Andy Green and Ian Livingston to align their packages with their revised responsibilities in a highly competitive market.
Performance-related remuneration |
The annual bonus plan is designed to reward the achievement of results against set objectives.
For the financial year 2004/05, on-target and maximum (requiring truly exceptional performance) bonus levels for executive directors and OC members, as a percentage of salary, were 75% and 150%, respectively, and for the Chief Executive they were 127.5% and 195%, with one-third of any bonus
payable in the form of deferred shares. Under his contract the Chairman is not entitled to a bonus.
Targets, in respect of corporate performance, set at the beginning of the financial year 2004/05 for each objective, to which specific weights were attached, were based on earnings per share, free cash flow and customer satisfaction. Delivery against these operational targets will be a key determinant of
success and supports BTs strategy for transformation and growth. For the three line of business Chief Executives, 75% of the potential bonus was linked to BTs corporate performance and 25% to the performance of their respective line of business. For all other relevant executives, bonuses were based
solely on corporate performance. The Committee retains the flexibility to enhance or reduce bonus awards in exceptional circumstances.
Achievement against corporate targets in the financial year 2004/05: |
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Earnings per
share
weighting
40% of target |
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Free cash
flow
weighting
40% of target |
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Customer
satisfaction
weighting
20% of
target |
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Total % of target |
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37 |
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20 |
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18 |
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75 |
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(Note threshold reflects 50% of target; target is 100% and stretch is 150%)
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The deferred share element of the annual bonus is paid under the Deferred Bonus Plan (DBP). The shares are held in trust and transferred to the executive after three years if still employed by the company. There are no additional performance measures for the vesting of deferred share awards. The
Committee considers that deferring a part of the annual bonus in this way also acts as a retention measure and contributes to aligning management with long-term shareholder interest.
These deferred awards for Ben Verwaayen, Andy Green, Hanif Lalani, Ian Livingston and Paul Reynolds at the end of the financial year 2004/05 are contained in the deferred bonus table. The initial values of the awards are in note f in the Directors' emoluments table.
The BT Equity Incentive Portfolio (the Portfolio) is designed to ensure that equity participation is an important part of overall remuneration. It comprises three elements: share options, incentive shares and retention shares. A combination of share options and incentive shares was used for equity participation
in the financial year 2004/05. Retention shares are used only as a recruitment or retention tool.
Under his service agreement, the Chairman is not entitled to receive annual grants of long-term incentive awards or options.
Normally, awards vest and options become exercisable only if a predetermined performance target has been achieved. The performance measure for outstanding awards and options is TSR (total shareholder return) compared with a relevant basket of companies. TSR links the reward given to directors
with the performance of BT against the shares of other major companies. For grants in the financial years 2001/02, 2002/03 and 2003/04, the comparator group was the FTSE 100 at 1 April in each year and for grants in the financial year 2004/05, TSR was measured against a comparator group of
companies from the European Telecom Sector.
At 1 April 2004, the group contained the following companies:
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BT
Group
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TDC
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Cable
& Wireless
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Tele2
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Cosmote
Mobile Telecommunications
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Telecom
Italia
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Deutsche
Telekom
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Telecom
Italia Mobile
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France
Telecom
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Telefonica
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Hellenic
Telecommunications
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Telekom
Austria
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O2
(formerly mmO2)
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Telenor
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Portugal
Telecom
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TeliaSonera
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KPN
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Vodafone
Group
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Swisscom
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The base price at the beginning of the performance period is calculated by averaging the share price of BT and other companies in the comparator group over the six months to 31 March prior to the award. However, for the awards granted in the financial year 2002/03, the period was from 19 November
2001 (the date of the O2 demerger) to 31 March 2002. The end price is the average of the share price over the six months to the end of the performance period, adjusted for all capital actions and dividend payments that occur during the performance period.
The price at which shares may be acquired
under the Global Share Option Plan (GSOP) is the market price at the
date of grant. Other than for new recruits, the size of option grant
is based on corporate and individual performance. Options are exercisable
after three years, subject to a performance target being met. The
Committee would not normally expect the initial value of annual grants
of options, based on the market price of a BT share, to exceed three
times base salary. In the financial year 2004/05, the maximum option
grant for executive directors and OC members was reduced to 1.5 times
base salary (see Incentive shares
below).
For options
granted subject to a TSR measure, BTs TSR at the end of the three-year
period must be in the upper quartile for all of the options to be exercisable. At
median, 30% of the options will be exercisable. Below that point, none of the
options may be exercised. The proportion of options that are exercisable reduces
on a straight-line basis between those points. For options granted in the financial
year 2002/03, if the performance measure is not met in full at the first measurement,
it may be re-tested against a fixed base in years four and five and for options
granted in the financial year 2003/04 may be re-tested in year five. If TSR has
not reached the median at the end of the fifth year, previously unexercisable
options will lapse. For options granted in the
financial year 2002/03, TSR had reached 74th position at the first measurement
relative to the FTSE 100 and performance will be re-tested in the financial year
2005/06. For options granted in the financial year 2004/05 there will be no re-testing,
and the policy of the Committee going forward is for there to
be no re-testing.
The one-off grant of additional options in the financial year 2002/03 to the senior executives most responsible for delivering BTs strategic plan lapsed on 31 March 2005, as the required 35% compound annual growth in BTs earnings per share over three years (equivalent to 22 pence per share at the
end of the 2005 financial year) was not achieved. The grant was not subject to a re-testing condition.
The option granted to Sir Christopher Bland on 22 June 2001 as part of his recruitment package is not subject to a performance measure as it matched a personal investment in BT shares of £1 million.
The details of the options held by Sir Christopher Bland, Ben Verwaayen, Andy Green, Hanif Lalani, Ian Livingston and Paul Reynolds at the end of the financial year 2004/05 are contained in the share options table.
In the financial year 2004/05 the Committee decided to grant a combination of performance-linked share options and incentive shares instead of a grant of share options. Incentive shares with a maximum value of two-thirds base salary were granted in the financial year 2004/05. Awards of incentive shares
vest after a performance period of three years, if the participant is still employed by BT and a performance measure has been met. For awards of incentive shares in the financial year 2004/05, TSR at the end of the three year period must be in the upper quartile relative to the comparator group for all of the
shares to vest. At median, 25% of the shares under award will vest. Below that point, none of the shares under award will vest. The proportion of shares that vests reduces on a straight-line basis between those points. There will be no re-testing, and no matching shares are being offered to any executive on
vesting of the incentive shares.
The details of incentive share awards held by Ben Verwaayen, Andy Green, Hanif Lalani, Ian Livingston and Paul Reynolds at the end of the financial year 2004/05 are contained in the share awards table.
Retention shares are granted under the Retention Share Plan (RSP) to individuals with critical skills, as a recruitment or retention tool. As a result, shares currently under award are not generally linked to a corporate performance target. The length of the retention period before awards vest is flexible. The
shares are transferred at the end of the specified period if the individual is still employed by BT.
Retention shares are used only in exceptional circumstances and, in the financial year 2004/05, six awards were made for recruitment purposes, none of which was to an executive director or OC member. The Committee has approved the grant of an award of retention shares to Ian Livingston with an
initial market value of £1m, to help secure his appointment and long-term retention as Chief Executive, BT Retail. It is expected that these will be granted at the end of May 2005 and will vest in two tranches.
The awards under the RSP held by Sir Christopher Bland, Ben Verwaayen and Ian Livingston at the end of the financial year 2004/05, or which vested during the year, are contained in the vesting of outstanding awards table.
The executive directors and the Chairman
may participate in BTs HM Revenue & Customs approved all-employee
share plans, the Employee Sharesave Scheme and Employee Share Investment
Plan (which replaced the BT Employee Share Ownership Scheme), on the
same basis as other employees. There are further details of these
plans in note
31 to the accounts.
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